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Abstract 
The crisis regarding the Euro area has caused several business closures, especially 
in the periphery of the EMU. In this paper, we use an original Italian firm-level 
dataset to determine why firms exit the market during times of economic crisis, 
paying particular attention to the role of intangibles. We argue that intangibles 
strengthen a firm’s resilience, which improves the firm’s ability to cope with 
adverse events and unexpected shocks. We obtain two main results: first, we show 
that the presence of intangibles significantly reduces the probability of firm exit, 
especially during the initial phase of the crisis; second, we find that financial 
constraints become more relevant than intangibles in explaining firm exit during 
the later stages of the crisis. Thus, the process of firm selection during the crisis 
has undergone a rapid transformation, with distortions that may lead even skilled 
firms to exit. Implications of these findings for EU recovery policies are 
discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
The crisis in Europe has left its mark on the corporate landscape. Over the past few years, nearly 
all EMU countries have seen aggregate business closures. According to Eurostat,1 between 2008 
and 2012, the Eurozone has experienced a 7% drop in the number of active manufacturing firms, 
with an average death rate of nearly 6%. Such a drop has been particularly acute in the periphery of 
the Eurozone. For instance, in Italy and Spain, the average death rate of firms ranges between 6% 
and 9%, and the overall drop in active manufacturing firms has been between 9% and 17%, 
respectively. These data are worrisome, especially when firm exit entails the loss of accumulated 
capabilities that are not replaced by the capabilities and skills of new entrants, as seems to be the 
case in the EU periphery. 
The economic literature has devoted a great deal of attention to studying the determinants of 
firm exit and survival. For example, work in industrial dynamics suggests that firm exit is 
negatively related to age and size (Dunne et al., 1988; Audretsch, 1991; Agarwal and Gort, 1996; 
Sutton, 1997) a consequence of successful path-dependent organizational learning, scale 
efficiencies, and market power. Instead, organization and innovation scholars emphasize the role of 
the technological capabilities of firms (Hall, 1987), which suggests the existence of an innovation 
premium in a firm’s survival (Cefis and Marsili, 2012). Moreover, with regard to the recent 
economic crisis, a small but growing amount of literature2 has stressed the importance of factors 
directly associated with macroeconomic shocks, such as financial constraints and a firm’s 
sensitivity to changes in aggregate demand and trade. 
In this paper, we contribute to this literature by studying the relationship between intangible 
assets and firm exit. Although the literature on intangible assets is extensive, to date, scholars have 
devoted relatively little attention to the role that these assets play in the face of the on-going global 
crisis. This is probably due to the general belief that intangible activities have little to do with the 
economic crisis. In this view, major decreases in demand are expected to bring about a reduction in 
intangible investments, so that the latter is perceived more as a consequence of the crisis rather than 
as the cause of variation in firm’s responses (Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011; Laperche et al., 2011). 
However, an emerging body of research suggests that a firm’s assets, including intangible assets, 
                                                 
1 Our own elaboration of the data is available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (Accessed on: 4th of 
September 2015). 
2 As suggested by Cleassens et al. (2012), the relatively small dimension of this literature is probably due to the fact that 
frim-level data for many countries has a long lag time prior to release. 
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can be important determinants of the firm’s capability to adapt to unexpected environmental 
changes (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005). This literature refers to the concept of a firm’s resilience 
capability and argues that intangibles can indeed contribute to firm performance in times of crisis. 
On this basis, the present paper investigates whether intangible assets play a role in the 
probability of a firm exiting the market during the recent crisis. In particular, we examine whether 
firms that invest in intangible assets have a lower probability of exit than firms that have relatively 
little to no investments in intangibles during times of economic crisis. Because investing in 
intangibles entails a certain degree of sunk costs and inevitably exposes firms to greater financial 
risk, the answer to this question is anything but trivial. In this sense, we may expect intangible 
assets to play a positive role only if the gain in terms of sustained resilience more than compensates 
for the cost of financing. 
We test our hypothesis on a sample of Italian manufacturing firms. We choose Italy because it is 
one of the Eurozone countries that has been severely impacted by the economic downturn. 
Moreover, we can exploit preferential access to a large firm-level dataset with detailed information 
on both intangible investments and the death of firms from 2006-2013. Overall, we obtain two main 
results: first, we show that intangible assets significantly reduce the probability of firm exit, 
especially during the initial phase of the crisis; second, we show that firm exit tends to be explained 
by different variables during different stages of the crisis. While early exits (i.e., before 2010) tend 
to be associated with both the presence of intangible assets and the market in which the firms 
operate, late exits tend to be a product of financial constraints. Moreover, we find that neither size 
nor age seems to play a relevant role in explaining firm exit during the crisis. The implications of 
these findings on European recovery policy are also discussed. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature. Section 3 presents the 
dataset, the variables, and some descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy. 
Section 5 shows the results. Section 6 lists some robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical and empirical background 
The determinants of firm exit and survival are the focus of extensive literature (see for instance 
Dunne et al., 1988; Klepper and Simons, 1997; Agarwal and Gort, 2002; Klepper and Thompson, 
2006; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). In industrial economics, it is usually argued that firm size and 
age positively affect the probability of survival. As new firms acquire experience through 
production and learning, they improve their internal efficiencies (Jovanovic, 1982). In the presence 
of market selection, this leads to an increase in size as well as the chance of survival over the 
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lifecycle of a firm. These predictions have been tested in a number of studies. While some 
contributions focus on the link between firm survival and the current size of all firms (Evans, 1987; 
Hall, 1987; Doms et al., 1995), other works investigate the effect of the firm’s initial size on post-
entry survival (Dunne et al., 1988; Mata and Portugal, 1994; Audretsch, 1995; Baldwin, 1995). 
Although some of these studies find a positive association between firm size and age and survival, 
the relationship can be non-linear, with the survival likelihood increasing with firm size but at a 
decreasing rate (see Evans, 1987; Hall, 1987). The significance, and even the sign of the 
relationship, can also vary  entrants (Wagner, 1994), industries (Audretsch et al., 1999) and stages 
of the product life cycle (Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001). Moreover, with specific reference to age, 
an inverted U-shaped function is observed in some cases, with the likelihood of surviving 
increasing shortly after entrance and then decreasing in later years (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1994; 
Wagner, 1994). 
In addition to size and age, the existence of financial constraints is also considered an important 
driver of firm exit. Financial constraints can hamper the firm’s ability to make strategic plans and at 
the same time, increase the firm’s sensitivity to external shocks. For instance, Winker (1999) along 
with Becchetti and Trovato (2002), find that perceived credit constraints have negative effects on a 
firm’s innovation expenditures and overall investment, which impacts the firm’s performance. With 
specific reference to firm exit, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) exploit a unique dataset matching personal 
wealth data to survival rates among US entrepreneurs; they show that inheritance reduces the 
probability of firm exit and interpret this finding as evidence for the existence of a negative 
relationship between credit constraints and firm survival. 
If financial constraints are relevant in general, they may be even more important during 
downturns in the business cycle. Cleassens et al. (2012) argue that the 2008-2009 crisis has 
impacted firm performance through a combination of two main channels: a financial one that has 
affected the firm’s ability to access credit, and a real one that has resulted in a contraction of 
internal demand and trade. Estimates reveal that in economic terms, the real channel is more 
important than the financial one, particularly during 2009. Medina (2012) and Wu (2012) find 
similar results. With specific reference to the Eurozone, Demelis et al. (2013) indicate a strong 
dependence on credit expansion before the crisis with regard to firm performance. However, post-
2008, the credit crunch has seemed to affect only slow-growth firms, especially those operating in 
domestic bank-dominated economies. Remarkably, all these contributions primarily measure firm 
performance in terms of sales and profits. To the best of our knowledge, very few contributions (see 
Godart et al. 2012; Wagner and Weche Gelübcke, 2013; Wagner, 2013; Clarke at al., 2012; 
Arrighetti et al., 2015) have dealt with the issue of firm survival in the context of the on-going 
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economic crisis. 
A useful framework for studying the drivers of firm exit in periods of economic downturn is to 
make a distinction between external and internal factors. External factors include all the variables 
that are external to a firm and may affect its survival. These factors embrace most of the variables 
that have been considered in previous literature, such as changes of aggregate demand and financial 
shocks. They also include factors related to institutional and technological features of the context in 
which firms operate, such as the geographic region and the industry. Internal factors include all the 
firm-specific characteristics that help when faced with sudden environmental changes. Some of 
these are structural factors, such as size, age, and financial tightness, while others are related to the 
managerial and organizational capabilities of a firm. Recent literature on managerial practices 
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010), which has attracted growing attention even among economists, 
suggests that the ‘soft’ skills and abilities of firms can indeed be important drivers of firms’ overall 
performance. 
In this paper, our main focus is on the role played by internal factors, particularly intangible 
assets. The latter have been the focus of a growing amount of literature in recent years. Different 
from the standard “R&D centric” approach to innovation, and in line with more recent trends such 
as the “system approach” to innovation (Carlsson et al., 2002) and the “open-innovation mode” 
(Chesbrough, 2003), this literature stresses the importance of additional factors as key drivers of 
firm innovation, such as designs, software, blueprints, technology licences, and trademarks 
(Montresor and Vezzani, 2014). These assets are generally referred to as intangibles and their 
contribution has been analysed with regard to different dimensions of economic activity. At the 
macro-level, growth-accounting exercises have shown that intangible assets account for a larger 
share of labour-productivity growth than tangible assets in a number of countries (Corrado et al., 
2005, 2009; Fukao et al., 2009; Marrano et al., 2009; Borgo et al., 2013). At the micro-level, a 
number of studies have pointed to the existence of a positive link between intangible assets and firm 
productivity (Marrocu et al., 2012; O’Mahony and Vecchi, 2009; Bartel, 2007; Bontempi and 
Mairesse, 2008; Jiménez-Rodríguez, 2012; Hall et al., 2013; Battisti et al., 2014), market value 
(Hall et al., 2005; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2006; Sandner and Block, 2011; Hulten and Hao, 2008), 
and export (Delgado-Gómez and Ramírez-Alesón, 2004). However, none of these studies have 
considered the impact of intangible assets on the likelihood of firm exit. 
We argue that during economic downturns, intangible assets can mitigate the risk of failure by 
strengthening the firm’s resilience capacity. Within the frame of the resource-based (Penrose, 1959, 
Barney, 1991, 2001) and capability-based theories of the firm (Dosi et al., 2000), resilience capacity 
is defined as the unique blend of cognitive, behavioural, and contextual properties that increase a 
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firm’s ability to respond to environmental changes (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005). Faced with an 
economic crisis, resilient firms have a lower chance of exiting the market because they are more 
capable of interpreting unfamiliar situations, devising new ways of confronting these events (e.g., to 
develop new routines), and mobilizing people, resources, and processes to transform these choices 
into reality. Indeed, discussions on organizational resilience have recently become more salient as 
the substantial disruptions associated with an unpredictable environment create a climate of 
uncertainty and crisis (Coutu, 2002; Horne & Orr, 1998; Mallak, 1998, Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011). 
According to Lengnick-Hall et al. (2011) the resilience capability depends on two main groups 
of factors: the amount and variety of resources available within the firm, and the firm’s capability to 
combine these different resources and develop new routines. While the former can be interpreted as 
a level and variety effect, the second is a dynamic capabilities effect that includes the processes of 
recombining and creating new capabilities. In both cases, intangible assets play an important role. 
As suggested by Teece et al. (1997), intangibles are not only key in determining the firm’s (specific) 
asset position but also in shaping the path through which new capabilities are generated (such as the 
role of knowledge management software in favouring assets recombination). When coping with 
economic downturns, firms endowed with intangible assets have a larger portfolio of assets (variety 
effects) as well as a greater ability to combine them (dynamic capabilities effect) to plan strategic 
responses. All else equal, we should expect firms with intangible assets to have a lower probability 
of exit during a crisis than firms with limited or no intangible assets. 
The quality of the assets accumulated by firms has already been considered as driver of firm exit 
and survival. Hall (1987), for instance, shows that the probability of firm exit decreases with the 
share of accumulated R&D expenditures of the firm. Similar results have been found regarding the 
type of entrepreneurial education and quality of human capital available within the firm (Bates, 
1990; Brüderl et al., 1992; Gimeno et al., 1997). Doms et al. (1995) and Colombo and Delmastro 
(2001) link firm exit to the quality of the physical assets and show that firms employing advanced 
manufacturing equipment have a lower chance of exiting. In so far as the output of the innovation 
process is concerned, Cefis and Marsili (2005) and Buddelmeyer et al. (2010) study the relationship 
between firm innovative performance and survival; they find that the former positively impacts the 
latter. However, none of these studies consider intangible assets as defined above. Moreover, no 
specific link is made between intangible assets and resilience capacity in times of crisis.  
 
3. Data, variable and descriptive analysis  
3.1 Data  
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We use data collected from two sources: the first wave of the MET survey and the AIDA-BVD 
database. Using these sources, we are able to integrate comprehensive data on intangible assets and 
exit, at firm level. The MET survey is a survey conducted by an Italian private research centre 
(Monitoraggio Economia e Territorio) every two years using a sample of nearly 25,000 Italian 
manufacturing firms (with partial sample overlap among the different waves).3 The sample ensures 
high representation in terms of firm size (4 dimensional classes), region of origin (20 regions), and 
industry (10 sectors disaggregated following the 3-digits ATECO 2002 classification). It includes 
firm-level information on the company’s internal structure, including information on the firm’s size, 
the types of investments realized, and the reference markets. The first wave is conducted during the 
summer of 2008, few months before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Therefore, it contains 
detailed information on the pre-crisis characteristics of firms, specifically during 2006-2007. 
The AIDA-BVD database contains disaggregated balance sheet and profit and loss statement 
information for the period 2007–2014 for all Italian firms. Moreover, it contains information on the 
present status of the firms (active vs. non-active and merged vs. acquired), which we use to 
distinguish between active and exited firms (see below). After having selected the firms that are 
active as of 2007, we match the information of the AIDA-BVD datasets with the responses to the 
MET survey, obtaining a final sample of 4,746 firms.4 The original sample representativeness in 
terms of firm size, region of origin and industry of activity is preserved.5 
Thus, we obtain an unbalanced panel with information in three time-horizons. First, we have 
firm-level information on both the internal structure and the financial position before the crisis, i.e., 
from 2006-2007. Second, we have access to the disaggregated balance sheet of all firms during the 
crisis, i.e., from 2007-2014. Finally, we can identify the firms that are still active and those that 
have exited the market by 2014. These data allow us to study the determinants of firm exit, and 
eventually distinguish among the different types of firm behaviour throughout the recession. 
 
3.2 Variables 
Our key variable distinguishes between active and exited firms. Information contained in the 
AIDA-BVD database allows us to detect firms that are active in 2007 but have changed their status 
before 2015. On this basis, we develop an algorithm (see Appendix A.1) that allows us to identify 
firms that have effectively exited the market (see also Arrighetti et al., 2015). In contrast to previous 
literature (see Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001; Cefis and Marsili, 2005), we can distinguish between 
                                                 
3 The MET survey share many features of the Capitalia’s Survey on Manufacturing Firms, another business survey 
carried out in Italy, which covers the periods ending respectively in 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2006. 
4 The reduction in the size of the original sample is due to the availability of disaggregated balance sheets in the AIDA-
BVD database (see subsection 3.2). 
5 Tables reporting on the sample’s representativeness are available from the authors upon request. 
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exit resulting from the death of the firm and exit occurring through merger and acquisition. In this 
paper, we focus only on the former; the firms subject to mergers and acquisitions are removed from 
of the sample. Unfortunately, we are unable to observe when an exit actually occurs, thus, the first 
dependent variable that we consider (EXIT) is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a firm has 
exited the market before 2015, and zero otherwise. 
In addition to the firm status in 2014, we have information on the evolution of firm’s sales for 
the period 2007-2014. On this basis, we construct a second variable that distinguishes between 
firms that exited relatively early and firms that exited late. In making such distinction, we use the 
year 2010, as a temporal threshold so that we can map the conventional differentiation between the 
“first” and “second” crisis, where the former is usually associated with the subprime mortgage crisis 
of 2008-2010 that originating in the US, and the latter refers to the ongoing European debt crisis 
that started in 2010. In particular, we classify firms as “early exit” if for the years 2011, 2012, and 
2013 they report more than a 90% reduction in sales compared to 2007. The value 90% is clearly 
arbitrary and it is introduced to control for possible noise in the sales data. We run some robustness 
checks using different values and find that results do not change (see below). “Late exit” firms are 
obviously defined as the difference between the firms that have exited the market before 2015 and 
the ones that exited the market earlier. Thus, we define a discrete variable STATUS taking value 1 if 
the firm is active in 2014, 2 if the firm is “early exit” (i.e., exited the market before 2010), and 3 if 
the firm is “late exit” (i.e., exited the market after 2010). 
Among the regressors, our focus is on intangible assets. According to the literature, there are 
several different ways to measure intangible assets. Here, we follow a balance sheet-type of 
approach, which considers the stocks originally reported as assets on companies’ asset and liability 
balance sheets. In particular, we consider a subset of the assets usually reported under the item 
“intangible fixed assets”, i.e., “research and advertisement expenditures”, “patents”, and “licenses 
and trademarks”.6 In doing so, we differ from previous contributions that use similar data (e.g., 
Marrocu et al., 2012) and instead consider the aggregate value “intangible fixed assets”. We make 
this choice because the item “intangible fixed assets” also includes goodwill, whose capitalisation is 
highly subject to managers’ discretion and as such, difficult to interpret. On the contrary, the items 
that we consider in our measure are the objective expenses incurred by firms.7 The sum of these 
                                                 
6 For more details on the composition of the item “intangible fixed assets” within the frame of the Italian legislation see 
Italian Civil Code, art. 2424. 
7 One of the main limitations in using company data to measure intangible assets is that firms may fail to give a full 
account of their intangible assets in the balance sheet. This is especially true for firms that adopt international 
accounting standards such as the IAS 38, which requires that research expenses be treated as expenses rather than 
assets. Although this can be a problem in general, it is not relevant in our sample. According to Italian legislation (Law 
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three assets is then normalised by each firm’s total asset size to compute the firm’s intangible capital 
intensity (ICI). At any given point in time, ICI i
t  is a proxy of the intangible assets accumulated by 
firm i in period t. 
As discussed in Arrighetti et al. (2014, 2015) and shown in Figure 1 the distribution of ICI is 
highly concentrated. In all industries and for all years, over 30% of firms report no investment in 
intangibles, while the top 10% of firms invest from 2% to 60% of their total assets in these assets. 
This distribution points to the existence of heterogeneity in the propensity to accumulate intangible 
capital, where the most striking distinction is between those who invest and those who do not. On 
this basis, our main goal is to understand if firms that invest in intangibles indeed enjoy an 
advantage in the probability of survival when faced with the shortcomings that follow a crisis.  
In addition to intangible assets, we include another set of variables usually associated with firm 
survival in our analysis. First, we consider a set of demographic and structural variables such as 
firm size measured in terms of number of employees (SIZE), age (AGE), and the degree of tangible 
capital intensity (TCI). Second, we consider a set of export-related indicators, such as the 
percentage of export sales (EXPORT) and whether a firm is active in EU (D_EU) and extra-EU 
(D_EXTRAEU) markets. Third, we consider a set of financial and profitability indexes, which 
include a measure of financial exposition (FINEXP), a liquidity index (LIQUID) and a return on 
assets index (ROA)8. A full description of all variables can be found in Appendix A.2. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
 
3.3. Descriptive analysis 
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for the entire sample of firms (column 1), the firms that 
are active (column 2) and the firms that exited the market before 2015 (column 3). The last column 
reports the results of an F-test on the difference between the mean values for active and exited 
firms. We notice that exited firms are on average younger (AGE), less productive (LAB_PRDTY, 
ROA), more financially exposed (FINEXP), and less liquid (LIQUID) than active firms. 
Interestingly, we find no significant difference regarding the firm’s orientation towards export 
                                                                                                                                                                  
306/2003 and Legislative Decree n. 38/2005), IAS 38 applies only to firms that are listed in the Italian Stock Exchange, 
which none of our firms are. Moreover, from preliminary interviews we have had with some of the firms in our sample, 
we know that they report research expenses as intangible assets on their balance sheets. This makes us confident that 
our measure is indeed a good proxy of a firm’s intangible assets. 
8 Given the relevance usually attributed to financial indicators in survival analysis, along with the fact that firm 
selection occurs mainly at the industry level, we normalize all financial indexes, namely FINEXP, LIQUID and ROA, 
by the industry average in our empirical analysis. 
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(EXPORT, D_EU, D_EXTRAEU) or firm size (SIZE).  
With respect to ICI, the univariate analysis suggests that on average, exited firms tend to be more 
intangible capital intensive than active firms. Although this result can be interpreted as a signal of a 
positive relation between ICI and the probability of firm exit, this is not always the case. As 
suggested above, the accumulation of intangibles requires firms to devote a substantial portion of 
their financial resources to these assets, whose benefits that are frequently delayed and highly 
uncertain. In this sense, the relatively high degree of ICI in exited firms is partially associated with 
a relatively high degree of financial exposition and low liquidity. Therefore, it is not clear which is 
the predominant factor. To gain a better understanding of the role of intangible assets, we use a 
multivariate analysis. This is the aim of the next two sections.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Before moving to the multivariate analysis, it is interesting to compare the performance of the 
three distinct groups of firms (i.e., active, late exit and early exit) throughout the recession. Apart 
from the interest per-se, this can also serve as a quality check on our classification. Along these 
lines, Figure 2 reports the evolution of the average of the firms’ sales during period 2007-2013 for 
active firms (close to 90% of the total), late exit firms (nearly 8% of the total) and early exit firms 
(nearly 2% of the total). As we can see, the crisis had a different impact on each type of firm. All 
firms experience a significant reduction in sales in the aftermath of the crisis, i.e., the year 2009. 
However, while the “active” firms came back to their initial level of sales and remained at that level 
throughout the remaining years, the other firms’ sales continued to decline. The early exit firms 
reduced their sales by more than 70% in less than 3 years. By 2011, they were already out of the 
market. The “late exit” firms experienced a somewhat less radical decline and after a partial 
stabilization between 2009 and 2011, they rapidly converged toward exiting the market in the last 
two years. The reason behind such a degree of heterogeneity in firm responses is the main focus of 
the remaining parts of the paper.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
We model the probability of firm exit as a function of two main types of variables. On one hand, 
we consider systemic variables, such as the industry and the geographic region in which the firm 
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operates. These variables are treated as control variables in our analysis. On the other hand, we 
consider firm-specific characteristics, with particular attention being paid to intangible capital 
intensity, as well as financial and export-related indicators. On this basis, we estimate the effect of 
each variable on the probability that a firm exits the market during period of 2008-2014.  
Formally, our baseline model takes the following form: 
 
   Pr(EXITi =1) = F XFi 'bF + XCi 'bC( ),   (1) 
 
where )( is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal, XFi is a vector of firm-
specific characteristics; XCi is the vector of control variables; and F  and C  are the vectors of 
parameters to be estimated. Our baseline assumption is that the beginning of the crisis acts as an 
exogenous and unexpected shock for firms, which allows us to identify the parameters in (1). To 
estimate the latter, we use a maximum likelihood (ML) estimation. 
Within vector XFi, our main focus is on the effect of intangible assets. As discussed in Section 3, 
ICI exhibits a highly skewed distribution, with a few firms investing significantly and many others 
investing nothing. To control for such heterogeneity, we replace the continuous variable ICIi with a 
dummy variable which takes value 1 if ICIi >0 and zero otherwise (D_ICIi). Moreover, we include a 
set of interaction terms to capture the financial conditions at the time the intangible investments are 
undertaken. These interaction terms are computed first by defining a set of robustness indicators 
D_FINEXPi, D_LIQUIDi, D_ROAi, such that D_FINEXPi = 1 if FINEXPi < FINEXP (0 otherwise), 
D_LIQUIDi = 1 if LIQUIDi > LIQUID (0 otherwise) and D_ROAi = 1 if ROAi > ROA (0 otherwise) 
where VAR for VAR = {FINEXP, LIQUID, ROA} is the median value of VAR. Then, we multiply 
these robustness indicators with variable D_ICIi to capture the firms that invest in intangibles 
during relatively robust financial conditions. These interaction terms capture the same conceptual 
constructs and are therefore used interchangeably with one another. 
In addition to the intangibles, we include in XFi other variables that are usually associated with 
the probability of firm survival, such as SIZEi, AGEi and TCIi. Moreover, given the international and 
financial nature of the crisis, especially during the initial period of 2008-2010, we also include a set 
of export  (EXPORTi, D_EUi, D_EXTRAEUi) and finance-related indicators (FINEXPi, LIQUIDi, 
ROAi) in XFi. 
In the vector of control variables (XCi), we include dummies for both the industry (using 
Pavitt’s (1984) classification) and the region of origin (distinguishing between the North, Centre, 
and South of Italy). As a robustness check, we also test for different types of industry and regional 
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classifications and observe robust results. 
All independent variables in equation (1) are evaluated at the beginning of the period, i.e., 
during 2006-2007. On this basis, we use these variables to predict the probability of a firm exiting 
the market within the next 7 years (i.e., before 2015). Given the structure of our data, we obviously 
cannot exclude the possibility of model misspecification and omitted variable bias. To address this 
issue, we saturate vector XCi with as many variables as we can in order to control for any kind of 
firm-specific effects (offsetting the risk of running into multicollinearity). Because our concern is 
especially related to ICI, we focus our attention on variables that can be correlated with the 
accumulation of intangible assets, such as labour productivity (LAB_PRDTYi), the degree of vertical 
integration (VERT_INTi) and a dummy variable indicating firm’s affiliation with a group 
(D_GROUPi). While this solution, together with the rather detailed specification of vector XFi, and 
the acceptable degree of correlation among regressors (see Table 2), should reduce the risk of 
omitted variable bias, some care must be taken in interpreting the results. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
As discussed above, the key feature of our dataset is that it allows us to track the behaviour of 
firms throughout the crisis. In particular, we can distinguish between different processes of firm 
exit, with some firms rapidly converging towards exit and others facing a more gradual process of 
selection. For this reason, we estimate the following multinomial logit model in addition to using 
the baseline model discussed above: 
 
Pr(STATUS= k) =
exp(XFi 'bF
k + XCi 'bC
k )
1+ exp(XFi 'bF
j + XCi 'bC
j )
j=1
3
å
 for  k = 1, 2, 3 (2) 
 
where STATUS
i
 is a discrete variable distinguishing between active, late exit and early exit firms. 
All the other variables remain the same as in model (1). By comparing the size and significant level 
of coefficients across these models, we will be able to investigate whether similar variables play 
different roles in explaining exit during distinct phases of the crisis. 
 
 
5. Results  
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Table 3 reports the estimates on the probability of exit, translated into marginal and impact 
effects for the continuous and dummy variables, respectively. First we add regressors included in 
XFi with the exclusion of intangible-related variables (Model 1). Then, we add D_ICIi to test the 
isolated effect of intangible assets (Model 2). Finally, we run three additional models in which we 
include the interaction between D_ICIi and the robustness indicators discussed above (Models 3, 4 
and 5). 
The first result that we obtain concerns the role of intangible assets. Whereas in isolation D_ICI 
is insignificant, when combined with indicators of a relatively robust financial condition, the effect 
is negative and significant. The size and significance level of the coefficient is consistent across 
models. This result lends support to the idea that when faced with an economic recession, intangible 
assets can reduce the probability of exiting the market, but only when combined with a sound 
financial position, i.e., low debt exposition or high liquidity and/or profitability. 
The relevance of the firm’s financial position is also confirmed by the results of the finance and 
profitability indexes, with some differences. While FINEXP and ROA significantly explain the 
probability of exit with a positive and negative sign, respectively, LIQUID is insignificant. This 
finding, combined with the negative and significant effect associated with TCI, suggests that in the 
aftermath of a crisis, firm selection depends more on the overall solidity of the firm’s budget than 
on the lack of ready-to-use liquid resources. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that in this estimation, we find no significant effects on export-
related indicators (EXPORT, D_EU, D_EXTRAEU), SIZE, or AGE. This result is quite striking, 
given the international nature of the crisis and the emphasis that is usually placed on firm size and 
age as drivers of survival. However, part of this result may be due to the relatively long time span 
that is considered in identifying firm exit (2008-2014). It may be possible that some of these 
variables are significant in explaining exit during the first phase of the crisis but not during the 
second phase. If that is the case, the estimates reported in Table 3 do not allow us to arrive at a clear 
conclusion on the role of these variables. 
To solve this issue, we report the multinomial estimates for early exit (columns 1-5) and late exit 
(columns 6-10) firms, with active firms as the excluded category, in Table 4. The hierarchical 
structure of the model is the same as above. We first estimate the model by excluding intangible 
assets, including D_ICI, and finally adding interaction terms between D_ICI and the robustness 
indicators D_FINEXPi, D_LIQUIDi, and D_ROAi,. 
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By comparing the results across the different models, we obtain the following results. Firstly, we 
find that while D_ICI is almost insignificant in explaining the probability of late exit (with the 
exception of models 8 and 9 where it is positive but weakly significant), it becomes negative and 
significant in explaining the probability of early exit. This result holds across all estimated models 
except model 3, where the sign is negative but insignificant. However, in the latter case, most of the 
variance related to the intangibles is captured by the interaction term with D_FINEXP, which takes 
a relatively large and highly significant sign. Overall, these estimates suggest that intangible assets 
affect the chance of firm survival, although their effect is associated with the phase of the crisis. 
During the initial phase, the presence of intangible assets significantly reduces the probability of 
exit, while in later stages, the contribution from intangible assets is weaker. 
Secondly, we find that even among financial constraints and profitability indicators there is some 
heterogeneity in the way in which they impact firm exit. While FINEXP and ROA significantly 
affect the probability of both early exit and late exit, LIQUID negatively and significantly explains 
only late exit. This result partially confirms the evidence reported in Table 1 on the limited role of 
liquid resources, suggesting that the latter can indeed become relevant as the recession continues. In 
this sense liquid resources function as instruments to address prolonged periods of economic 
contraction, than as tools to draw immediate responses to unexpected shocks. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The differentiated roles of intangible assets and financial and profitability indicators is confirmed 
by the results of their interaction terms. In particular, we find that while the interaction terms 
between D_ICI and the robustness indicators is always significant and negative in late exit models, 
it is only significant in one model out of three when we estimate the probability of early exit. These 
findings confirm the fact that the firm’s financial and profitability conditions were more relevant as 
drivers of firm exit during the second phase of the crisis as opposed to the first phase. On the 
contrary, intangible assets are key resources for survival, especially in the immediate aftermath of 
the downturn. 
The third result that we obtain concerns the role of export. In particular, we find that having a 
significant proportion of exports outside the EU is an important factor in differentiating between 
early exit and late exit. Indeed, the variable D_EXTRAEU is positive and highly significant in 
explaining the probability of early exit, while it is not significant in explaining late exit. No other 
export-related indicator is significant in our estimates. The most plausible interpretation of this 
result is that D_EXTRAEU captures the negative effect of the rapid decrease in international trade 
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volumes following the 2008 financial crisis. As the volume of international trade increases during 
the second phase of the crisis, the level of export becomes less relevant in explaining firm exit. In 
this sense, our results confirm the findings of Claessens et al. (2012) on the relevance of trade as a 
crisis transmission channel, especially during 2008-2009. 
Finally, the estimates reported in Table 4 confirm that neither size nor age plays a relevant role in 
explaining firm exit during a crisis. While size is never significant, age is negative but only weakly 
significant in explaining early exit. These results do not undermine the relevance of size and age as 
determinant of firm exit in general (although the available evidence in this sense is contradicting, 
see Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007), rather, they suggest that in the presence of negative and 
unexpected macroeconomic shocks, size and age are not characteristics that differentiate between 
firms’ responses. 
Overall, the results of our estimates provide a fairly encouraging picture concerning the role of 
intangible assets as drivers of a firm’s resilience. If no distinction is made between the “first” and 
“second” crisis, intangible assets reduce the probability of firm exit, but only if they are 
accumulated within the frame of a sound financial position. If a distinction between different phases 
of the crisis is made, the presence of intangible assets significantly reduces the probability of early 
exit, independent of the firm’s financial position. This result confirms that firms with intangible 
assets exhibit greater capacity to cope with adverse and unexpected economic conditions than firms 
without in tangible assets, especially during the years immediately after a shock occurs. 
6. Robustness checks 
To increase the reliability of our results, we conduct a series of robustness checks. First, we 
consider different region and industry classifications. With respect to the region we replace the 
dummies distinguishing North, Centre and South of Italy with regional dummies for the 
administrative regions. With reference to the industry we replace Pavitt’s classification with Istat’s 
Ateco 2-digits classification (equivalent to the Eurostat’s Nace). Results are reported in Table 5 and 
6. We find that all previous results remain valid. In particular, intangible assets (D_ICI) take a 
negative and significant value in explaining exit before 2015, but only if they are combined with a 
firm’s sound financial position. In the multinomial logit estimates intangible assets significantly 
reduce the probability of early exit, while their effect on late exit still depends on the interaction 
with the financial and profitability indexes. Overall, we conclude that our results are robust to 
alternative region and industry classifications. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
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[Table 6 here] 
 
Second, we change the threshold value to distinguish between early exit and late exit. In the 
multinomial logit estimates reported in Section 5, we consider a 90% drop in sales for the years 
2011, 2012 and 2014 as a proxy for firm exit. Next, we run the same estimates considering a drop in 
sales of 85% and 95%, respectively. The results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. We notice that most 
of the previous results hold. Intangible assets (D_ICI) significantly reduce the probability of early 
exit. In the case of late exit, intangible assets are significant only when they interact with the 
financial and profitability indexes. At the same time, while FINEXP and ROA are significant in 
explaining both early exit and late exit, LIQUID is significant only when regressed against the 
latter. Furthermore, in line with the previous estimate, SIZE and AGE are insignificant (or of limited 
significance) in all models. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
Given that size is usually considered an important driver of firm survival, we also test to 
determine how our results react to a different specification of SIZE. In particular, we estimated both 
the probit and the multinomial logit models by substituting the continuous measure given by the log 
of employees with dummy variables for small (< 49 employees) and large firms (> 250 employees). 
The results are reported in Tables 9 and 10. Interestingly, we find that the role of size changes 
depending on the model. In the probit estimates, where we do not distinguish between early and late 
exit, large size is insignificant. On the contrary, in multinomial logit estimates, large size is positive 
and significantly associated with early exit and negative and significantly associated with late exit. 
Results for all the other variables remain unchanged. This odd behaviour of the dummy variable for 
large firms confirms that the relationship between firm size and survival is at least ambiguous. 
 
[Table 9 here] 
 
[Table 10 here] 
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7. Conclusion 
The recent crisis in Europe has caused several business closures, especially in the EMU 
periphery. In this paper, we use an original firm-level dataset from Italy to study whether intangible 
assets reduce the probability of firm exit during the crisis. We argue that intangible assets strengthen 
the firm’s resilience capacity via both the variety and dynamic capabilities effects, which allows 
firms to develop adequate responses in the face of adverse and unexpected shocks. 
On the basis of our analysis, we obtain two main results. First we show that intangible assets 
significantly reduce the probability of firm exit, especially during the initial phase of the crisis. 
Second, we show that financial weaknesses become more relevant than intangibles in explaining 
firm exit at later stages of the crisis. If taken together, these two findings point towards the existence 
of a different model of firm selection during the first (i.e., 2008-2010) and second crises (i.e., 2011-
2014), with financial constraints becoming much more salient during the latter. 
In addition, some of our findings confirm the results obtained by the previous literature. First of 
all, in line with Claessens et al. (2012), we find that trade operates as an important transmission 
channel through which the subprime crisis spread to Europe. Secondly, we find that at time of crisis, 
firm age has no effect on firm exit. Finally, we confirm that firm size has a relatively ambiguous 
effect on firm survival. The latter result reinforces the general scepticism on the role of firm size as 
a good predictor of survival (e.g., Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). 
Based on these results, some interesting policy implications can be drawn. As the extensive 
literature shows, intangible assets are usually associated with positive measures of firm 
performance, in terms of both productivity and innovativeness. Our results suggest that the 
prolonged economic recession is likely to produce a distortion in the process of firm selection. If at 
the beginning of the crisis intangible assets can still ensure a survival premium in favour of best 
performing firms, this effect weakens during the later stages of the crisis. As the negative economic 
outlook continues, firm selection is increasingly driven by financial and budgetary weaknesses 
irrespective of the capabilities accumulated by firms. If this result is confirmed in other EU 
countries, policy makers should be worried about the significant economic losses entailed by it. In 
addition to the cost of unemployment, the selection of firms with valuable skills may produce a 
long-term capability gap with respect to international competitors, which may delay the full 
recovery of EU economies. In this sense, we should welcome policy interventions aimed at 
softening the pressure caused by financial constraints (e.g., through easier access to credit) that can 
potentially reduce the impact of selective distortion. 
 
19 
 
Acknowledgement 
We thank participants to the C.Met 05 workshop held at the University of Venice for the useful 
comments. 
Appendix. 
A.1 “Active” vs. “exited” firms  
 
The identification of firms that are part of the 2008 MET survey and exited the market before 
2015 is based on the information contained in the AIDA-BVD database. For each firm such 
database makes it possible to establish the “firm status” following different types of legal action. 
The available classification distinguishes between firms that are “active” and those that are 
“inactive” or “in liquidation”. 
Then, independently of the available “firm status”, we checked whether the AIDA-BVD 
database contains information on the specific legal actions to which a firm may be subjected. 
Although an ending date for pending legal action is not always available in the database, it is 
plausible to assume that the opening of such an action (for instance the company’s liquidation or 
failure) is a signal of a significant downsizing of the firm’s operations, which may even be 
associated with the firm’s actual exit. On this basis, we have identified a series of criteria that help 
us categorize firms as being either “active” or “exited”. In particular, we define a firm as “active” if 
in 2014: 
a) Her status in the AIDA-BVD database is “active” with no pending legal actions; 
b) Her status in the AIDA-BVD database is “active” and there are pending legal actions that 
refer only to a transfer to another province. 
A firm is instead categorized as “exited” if in 2014: 
a) Her status in the AIDA-BVD database is “in liquidation” 
b) Her status in the AIDA-BVD database is “inactive” and there are no pending legal actions 
related to merges and/or acquisitions 
c) Her status in the AIDA-BVD database is “active” and there are pending legal actions related 
to debt restructuring, failure, liquidation, insolvency, creditor agreement. 
Moreover, a third category of firms was created with the label “in transformation”. A firm is 
categorized as “in transformation” if in 2014: 
a) Her status in the AIDA-BVD database is “active” and there are pending legal procedures 
related to merges and/or acquisitions; 
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b) Her status in the AIDA-BVD database is “inactive” and there are pending legal 
procedures related to merges and/or acquisitions; 
In the present paper we consider only firms that are categorized as “active” or “exited”. Firms 
categorized as “in transformation” are removed from the sample. 
 
 
A.2 List of the variables 
 
 ICI: intangible assets / tot. assets in 2007. 
 TCI: tangible assets / tot. assets in 2007. 
 SIZE: logarithm of the number of employees in 2007. 
 AGE: logarithm of 2007 less the year of foundation. 
 LAB_PRDTY: added value / number of employees in 2007. 
 EXPORT: sales occurred through export / total sales in 2007.  
 D_EU: = 1 if % of sales in EU countries > 50%, 0 otherwise 
 D_EXTRAEU: = 1 if % of sales in extra EU countries > 50%, 0 otherwise 
 FINEXP: (liabilities – net assets – credits) / net assets in 2007. 
 LIQUID: liquid assets / net assets in 2007 
 ROA: net income / average total assets in 2007 
 D_GROUP: = 1 if firm belong to a group, 0 otherwise 
 VERT_INT: added value / total sales in 2007 
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Figure 1 – Quantile distribution of ICI in 2007 
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Figure 2 – Evolution of firm’s sales: active vs. late exit vs. early exit 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
 
All (1) 
(n. 4747)  
Active (2) 
(n. 4398) 
 Exit (3) 
(n. 349)  
 mean sd  mean sd  mean sd F-test 
SIZE 87.196 188.961  87.850 192.616  78.935 134.407  
AGE 35.368 18.292  35.494 18.446  33.782 16.163 * 
VERT_INT 0.278 0.151  0.279 0.151  0.267 0.158  
D_GROUP 0.328 0.470  0.328 0.470  0.325 0.469  
LAB_PRDTY 57.208 39.190  57.905 39.190  48.404 38.160 *** 
TCI 0.210 0.163  0.210 0.162  0.206 0.170  
EXPORT 21.589 29.076  21.576 29.016  21.753 29.869  
D_EU (d) 0.059 0.236  0.059 0.236  0.057 0.233  
D_EXTRAEU (d) 0.029 0.169  0.029 0.167  0.040 0.197  
FINEXP (index) 3.079 10.256  2.776 6.987  6.908 28.353 *** 
LIQUID (index) 0.073 0.104  0.074 0.104  0.057 0.099 ** 
ROA (index) 0.068 0.083  0.071 0.083  0.032 0.074 *** 
ICI 0.008 0.028  0.008 0.026  0.011 0.040 ** 
Legend: *=sig. 10%; **=sig. 5%; ***=sig. 1% 
 
 
29 
 
Table 2 – Correlation matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) SIZE 1.000 
           
(2) AGE 0.216* 1.000 
          
(3) VERT_INT 0.118* 0.042* 1.000 
         
(4) D_GROUP 0.440* 0.037* 0.019 1.000 
        
(5) LAB_PRDTY 0.033* 0.043* 0.022 0.096* 1.000 
       
(6) TCI 0.022 0.074* 0.200* -0.014 -0.053* 1.000 
      
(7) EXPORT 0.240* 0.096* -0.024 0.176* 0.065* -0.036* 1.000 
     
(8) D_EU 0.058* 0.030* -0.028 0.050* 0.015 -0.014 0.530* 1.000 
    
(9) D_EXTRAEU 0.062* 0.020 -0.022 0.051* 0.036* -0.040* 0.401* -0.044* 1.000 
   
(10) FINEXP -0.056* -0.099* -0.034* -0.033* -0.084* 0.049* -0.014 0.012 -0.010 1.000 
  
(11) LIQUID -0.125* 0.005 0.119* -0.083* 0.104* -0.210* 0.029* 0.043* 0.043* -0.065* 1.000 
 
(12) ROA -0.027 -0.059* 0.277* -0.023 0.4120* -0.141* 0.024 0.016 0.027 -0.127* 0.276* 1.000 
(13) D_ICI 0.380* 0.040* -0.050* 0.208* 0.104* -0.015 0.162* 0.056* 0.035* -0.037* -0.137* -0.032* 
Legend: *=sig. 5% 
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Table 3 – Results of the probit estimates on the probability of firm exit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Dep. Var.: dummy = 1 if the firm exits before 2015, 0 otherwise 
  
SIZE 0.007 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.019 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
AGE -0.08 -0.084 -0.071 -0.092 -0.088 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
VERT_INT 0.314* 0.295 0.333* 0.322* 0.28 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
D_GROUP -0.007 -0.006 0.009 -0.009 -0.006 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
LAB_PRDTY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TCI -0.497*** -0.497*** -0.531*** -0.503*** -0.515*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
EXPORT 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
D_EU (d) -0.046 -0.047 -0.038 -0.053 -0.037 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
D_EXTRAEU (d) 0.242 0.238 0.239 0.227 0.248 
 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
FINEXP (index) 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
LIQUID (index) -0.032 -0.034 -0.027 -0.034 -0.002 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ROA (index) -0.218*** -0.220*** -0.210*** -0.189*** -0.217*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
D_ICI (d) 
 
-0.079 0.041 -0.004 0.034 
  
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
D_ICI*D_FINEXP (d)  -0.323***   
   (0.08)   
D_ICI*D_ROA (d) 
   
-0.188** 
 
    
(0.08) 
 D_ICI*D_LIQUID (d) 
    
-0.247***
     
(0.08) 
 
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
      
Costant -1.146*** -1.120*** -1.193*** -1.137*** -1.126*** 
 
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Obs 4746 4746 4746 4746 4746 
LogL -1178.399 -1177.669 -1168.505 -1175.076 -1172.864 
Chi2 131.584*** 133.044*** 151.373*** 138.230*** 142.655*** 
Legend: *=sig. 10%; **=sig. 5%; ***=sig. 1% 
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Table 4 – Results of the multinomial logit estimates on the probability of exit early vs. late 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Early: firm exit before 2010; excluded category: active firms  Late: firm exit between 2010-2014; excluded category: active firm 
SIZE 0.003 0.111 0.114 0.112 0.112  0.032 0.02 0.023 0.022 0.019 
 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
AGE -0.378* -0.406* -0.378* -0.411* -0.409*  -0.07 -0.067 -0.039 -0.085 -0.074 
 
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
VERT_INT 0.298 0.115 0.19 0.131 0.103  0.724* 0.746* 0.790** 0.785** 0.698* 
 
(0.69) (0.70) (0.69) (0.70) (0.70)  (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) 
D_GROUP 0.06 0.078 0.109 0.076 0.079  -0.06 -0.061 -0.036 -0.071 -0.059 
 
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)  (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
LAB_PRDTY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TCI -0.821 -0.818 -0.89 -0.821 -0.841  -0.988** -0.988** -1.046** -1.012** -1.010** 
 
(0.71) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70)  (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
EXPORT -0.011* -0.01 -0.011 -0.01 -0.01  0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
D_EU (d) 0.694 0.729 0.75 0.725 0.745  -0.24 -0.243 -0.216 -0.256 -0.222 
 
(0.65) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66)  (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
D_EXTRAEU (d) 1.822*** 1.810*** 1.831*** 1.801*** 1.825***  -0.003 0.002 0.022 -0.022 0.019 
 
(0.65) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66)  (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
FINEXP (index) 0.055*** 0.052*** 0.042** 0.051*** 0.052***  0.058*** 0.058*** 0.048*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
LIQUID (index) 0.11 0.092 0.105 0.091 0.114  -0.171*** -0.168*** -0.151** -0.165*** -0.081 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
ROA (index) -0.425*** -0.433*** -0.411*** -0.407*** -0.432***  -0.431*** -0.432*** -0.411*** -0.359*** -0.427*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
D_ICI (d) 
 
-0.724*** -0.398 -0.660** -0.583**  
 
0.091 0.291* 0.24 0.297* 
  
(0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.28)  
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
D_ICI*D_FINEXP (d) 
  
-1.024*** 
  
 
  
-0.571*** 
  
   
(0.37) 
  
 
  
(0.18) 
  D_ICI*D_ROA (d) 
   
-0.166
 
 
   
-0.448**
 
    
(0.35) 
 
 
   
(0.20) 
 D_ICI*D_LIQUID (d) 
    
-0.284  
    
-0.495***
 (0.32)  (0.19) 
            
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
            
Costant -1.674* -1.514* -1.680* -1.533* -1.519*  -3.047*** -3.082*** -3.222*** -3.123*** -3.095*** 
 
(0.90) (0.91) (0.91) (0.91) (0.91)  (0.65) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) 
      
 
     Obs 4746 4746 4746 4746 4746  4746 4746 4746 4746 4746
LogL -1368.882 -1363.987 -1354.383 -1361.2 -1360.257  -1368.882 -1363.987 -1354.383 -1361.2 -1360.257 
Chi2 152.611*** 162.401*** 181.609*** 167.976*** 169.862***  152.611*** 162.401*** 181.609*** 167.976*** 169.862*** 
Legend: *=sig. 10%; **=sig. 5%; ***=sig. 1% 
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Table 5 – Results of the probit estimates with different classifications for regions and industries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Dep. Var.: dummy = 1 if the firm exits before 2015, 0 otherwise 
  
SIZE -0.001 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
AGE -0.045 -0.049 -0.036 -0.058 -0.054 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
VERT_INT 0.077 0.054 0.095 0.079 0.03 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
D_GROUP 0.033 0.033 0.049 0.029 0.033 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
LAB_PRDTY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TCI -0.430** -0.430** -0.466** -0.429** -0.440** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
EXPORT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
D_EU (d) -0.066 -0.068 -0.057 -0.071 -0.057 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
D_EXTRAEU (d) 0.277 0.272 0.277 0.259 0.28 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
FINEXP (index) 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
LIQUID (index) -0.037 -0.040* -0.033 -0.040* -0.006 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
ROA (index) -0.220*** -0.222*** -0.211*** -0.187*** -0.219*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
D_ICI (d) 
 
-0.087 0.034 -0.003 0.031 
  
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
D_ICI*D_FINEXP (d)  -0.330***   
   (0.08)   
D_ICI*D_ROA (d) 
   
-0.214** 
 
    
(0.09) 
 D_ICI*D_LIQUID (d) 
    
-0.261***
     
(0.08) 
     
Regional dummies (Ad. Reg.) yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies (NACE 2d) yes yes yes yes yes 
      
Costant -0.676* -0.642* -0.718* -0.666* -0.668* 
 
(0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
Obs 4746 4746 4746 4746 4746 
LogL -1144.087 -1143.237 -1134.17 -1140.045 -1138.144 
Chi2 200.209*** 201.908*** 220.042*** 208.292*** 212.095*** 
Legend: *=sig. 10%; **=sig. 5%; ***=sig. 1% 
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Table 6 – Results of the multinomial logit estimates with different classifications for regions and industries 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Early: firm exit before 2010; excluded category active firm  Late: firm exit between 2010-2014; excluded category: active firm 
SIZE 0.004 0.118 0.124 0.12 0.118  0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 
 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
AGE -0.332 -0.361 -0.337 -0.369 -0.364  0.01 0.014 0.041 -0.004 0.006 
 
(0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
VERT_INT 0.096 -0.137 -0.047 -0.125 -0.152  0.227 0.249 0.299 0.28 0.18 
 
(0.76) (0.78) (0.77) (0.78) (0.78)  (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) 
D_GROUP 0.158 0.164 0.188 0.159 0.162  0.025 0.025 0.051 0.017 0.026 
 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)  (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
LAB_PRDTY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TCI -0.602 -0.63 -0.709 -0.625 -0.65  -0.861* -0.857* -0.920** -0.860* -0.863* 
 
(0.73) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.73)  (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) 
EXPORT -0.012* -0.012* -0.012* -0.012* -0.012*  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
D_EU (d) 0.839 0.88 0.877 0.874 0.887  -0.308 -0.309 -0.282 -0.311 -0.292 
 
(0.67) (0.67) (0.67) (0.67) (0.67)  (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) 
D_EXTRAEU (d) 1.985*** 1.974*** 1.986*** 1.958*** 1.981***  0.069 0.078 0.101 0.058 0.076 
 
(0.67) (0.68) (0.68) (0.68) (0.68)  (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) 
FINEXP (index) 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.045** 0.054*** 0.055***  0.066*** 0.065*** 0.056*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
LIQUID (index) 0.086 0.067 0.079 0.067 0.09  -0.169*** -0.166*** -0.150** -0.163** -0.077 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
ROA (index) -0.439*** -0.438*** -0.415*** -0.407*** -0.436***  -0.448*** -0.450*** -0.427*** -0.373*** -0.444*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
D_ICI (d) 
 
-0.747*** -0.419* -0.663** -0.602**  
 
0.09 0.283* 0.245 0.303* 
  
(0.24) (0.25) (0.27) (0.29)  
 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) 
D_ICI*D_FINEXP (d) 
  
-1.044*** 
  
 
  
-0.555*** 
  
   
(0.37) 
  
 
  
(0.18) 
  D_ICI*D_ROA (d) 
   
-0.227
 
 
   
-0.459**
 
    
(0.35) 
 
 
   
(0.20) 
 D_ICI*D_LIQUID (d) 
    
-0.293  
    
-0.514***
 (0.33)  (0.19) 
            
Regional dummies (Ad. Reg.) yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies (NACE 2d) yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
            
Costant 0.046 0.297 0.064 0.272 0.266  -2.650*** -2.683*** -2.841*** -2.709*** -2.726*** 
 
(1.07) (1.07) (1.08) (1.08) (1.07)  (0.94) (0.94) (0.94) (0.94) (0.94) 
      
 
     Obs 4746 4746 4746 4746 4746  4746 4746 4746 4746 4746
LogL -1316.571 -1311.533 -1302.328 -1308.618 -1307.631  -1316.571 -1311.533 -1302.328 -1308.618 -1307.631 
Chi2 257.232*** 267.310*** 285.719*** 273.140*** 275.113***  257.232*** 267.310*** 285.719*** 273.140*** 275.113*** 
Legend: *=sig. 10%; **=sig. 5%; ***=sig. 1% 
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Table 7 – Results of the multinomial logit estimates on the probability of exit early vs. late: 85% threshold 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Early: firm exit before 2010; excluded category: active firm  Late: firm exit between 2010-2014; excluded category: active firm 
SIZE 0.014 0.138 0.140 0.137 0.137  0.027 0.014 0.017 0.016 0.014 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
AGE -0.417* -0.450* -0.427* -0.449* -0.451*  -0.069 -0.066 -0.035 -0.086 -0.074 
 
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
VERT_INT 0.390 0.182 0.243 0.177 0.175  0.676* 0.701* 0.750* 0.744* 0.651* 
 
(0.71) (0.73) (0.72) (0.73) (0.73)  (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) 
D_GROUP -0.036 -0.017 0.006 -0.018 -0.017  -0.026 -0.028 0.000 -0.039 -0.025 
 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
LAB_PRDTY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TCI -0.514 -0.520 -0.577 -0.513 -0.530  -1.076** -1.076** -1.139*** -1.104*** -1.105*** 
 
(0.73) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72) (0.72)  (0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
EXPORT -0.01 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009  0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
D_EU (d) 0.766 0.800 0.818 0.807 0.805  -0.249 -0.253 -0.224 -0.267 -0.228 
 
(0.67) (0.67) (0.67) (0.67) (0.67)  (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
D_EXTRAEU (d) 1.720** 1.706** 1.730** 1.715** 1.712**  0.109 0.113 0.132 0.085 0.133 
 
(0.69) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70)  (0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42) 
FINEXP (index) 0.055*** 0.052*** 0.042** 0.051*** 0.051***  0.058*** 0.058*** 0.048*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
LIQUID (index) 0.087 0.064 0.074 0.063 0.077  -0.137** -0.133** -0.115* -0.130** -0.043 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ROA (index) -0.422*** -0.430*** -0.409*** -0.426*** -0.428***  -0.433*** -0.435*** -0.412*** -0.354*** -0.429*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
D_ICI (d) 
 
-0.833*** -0.555** -0.851*** -0.760**  
 
0.101 0.318** 0.264 0.334* 
  
(0.25) (0.27) (0.28) (0.30)  
 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
D_ICI*D_FINEXP (d) 
  
-0.826** 
  
 
  
-0.628*** 
  
   
(0.37) 
  
 
  
(0.18) 
  D_ICI*D_ROA (d) 
   
0.067
 
 
   
-0.500***
 
    
(0.36) 
 
 
   
(0.19) 
 D_ICI*D_LIQUID (d) 
    
-0.145  
    
-0.550***
 (0.34)  (0.19) 
            
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
            
Costant -1.633* -1.448 -1.579* -1.443 -1.449  -3.021*** -3.058*** -3.214*** -3.103*** -3.075*** 
 
(0.94) (0.94) (0.94) (0.94) (0.94)  (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) 
      
 
     Obs 4746 4746 4746 4746 4746  4746 4746 4746 4746 4746 
LogL -1361.263 -1355.37 -1346.21 -1351.864 -1350.891  -1361.263 -1355.37 -1346.21 -1351.864 -1350.891 
Chi2 148.204*** 159.991*** 178.311*** 167.004*** 168.948***  148.204*** 159.991*** 178.311*** 167.004*** 168.948*** 
Legend: *=sig. 10%; **=sig. 5%; ***=sig. 1% 
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Table 8 – Results of the multinomial logit estimates on the probability of exit early vs. late: 95% threshold 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Early: firm exit before 2010; excluded category: active firm  Late: firm exit between 2010-2014; excluded category: active firm 
SIZE -0.017 0.098 0.101 0.098 0.099  0.039 0.023 0.026 0.025 0.023 
 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
AGE -0.336 -0.367 -0.340 -0.372* -0.370*  -0.081 -0.076 -0.048 -0.094 -0.084 
 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
VERT_INT 0.130 -0.073 0.008 -0.055 -0.085  0.782** 0.813** 0.855** 0.851** 0.763* 
 
(0.71) (0.72) (0.71) (0.72) (0.72)  (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) 
D_GROUP 0.133 0.153 0.183 0.150 0.154  -0.087 -0.089 -0.064 -0.099 -0.087 
 
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)  (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
LAB_PRDTY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TCI -0.775 -0.767 -0.841 -0.769 -0.790  -1.001** -1.001** -1.057** -1.025** -1.023** 
 
(0.69) (0.69) (0.69) (0.69) (0.69)  (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
EXPORT -0.011* -0.010 -0.011* -0.010 -0.010  0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
D_EU (d) 0.662 0.701 0.720 0.696 0.717  -0.239 -0.244 -0.216 -0.256 -0.222 
 
(0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.66)  (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
D_EXTRAEU (d) 1.802*** 1.790*** 1.809*** 1.779*** 1.804***  -0.005 0.000 0.020 -0.024 0.017 
 
(0.65) (0.65) (0.66) (0.65) (0.66)  (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
FINEXP (index) 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.041** 0.050*** 0.051***  0.058*** 0.059*** 0.049*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
LIQUID (index) 0.091 0.072 0.085 0.072 0.095  -0.163** -0.159** -0.141** -0.155** -0.071 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
ROA (index) -0.402*** -0.410*** -0.389*** -0.383*** -0.408***  -0.438*** -0.440*** -0.418*** -0.366*** -0.434*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
D_ICI (d) 
 
-0.763*** -0.434* -0.694*** -0.619**  
 
0.124 0.322* 0.273 0.335* 
  
(0.23) (0.25) (0.26) (0.28)  
 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) 
D_ICI*D_FINEXP (d) 
  
-1.043*** 
  
 
  
-0.564*** 
  
   
(0.37) 
  
 
  
(0.18) 
  D_ICI*D_ROA (d) 
   
-0.185
 
 
   
-0.446**
 
    
(0.34) 
 
 
   
(0.20) 
 D_ICI*D_LIQUID (d) 
    
-0.293  
    
-0.500***
 (0.32)  (0.19) 
            
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
            
Costant -1.634* -1.467 -1.632* -1.488* -1.471*  -3.083*** -3.133*** -3.272*** -3.174*** -3.148*** 
 
(0.89) (0.89) (0.90) (0.89) (0.89)  (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) 
      
 
     Obs 4746 4746 4746 4746 4746  4746 4746 4746 4746 4746 
LogL -1372.933 -1367.109 -1357.418 -1364.339 -1363.292  -1372.933 -1367.109 -1357.418 -1364.339 -1363.292 
Chi2 152.462*** 164.110*** 183.493*** 169.650*** 171.744***  152.462*** 164.110*** 183.493*** 169.650*** 171.744*** 
Legend: *=sig. 10%; **=sig. 5%; ***=sig. 1% 
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Table 9 – Results of the probit estimates with control dummies for firm size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Dep. Var.: dummy = 1 if the firm exits before 2015, 0 otherwise 
  
D_LARGE -0.153 -0.143 -0.134 -0.151 -0.159 
 
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
D_SMALL -0.078 -0.087 -0.088 -0.091 -0.093 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
AGE -0.080 -0.080 -0.067 -0.089 -0.084 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
VERT_INT 0.317* 0.308 0.345* 0.334* 0.293 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
D_GROUP -0.016 -0.009 0.004 -0.014 -0.009 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
LAB_PRDTY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TCI -0.501*** -0.499*** -0.533*** -0.506*** -0.519*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
EXPORT 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
D_EU (d) -0.051 -0.054 -0.043 -0.06 -0.045 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
D_EXTRAEU (d) 0.243 0.238 0.239 0.227 0.248 
 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
FINEXP (index) 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
LIQUID (index) -0.032 -0.035 -0.028 -0.035 -0.002 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ROA (index) -0.219*** -0.220*** -0.210*** -0.188*** -0.218*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
D_ICI (d) 
 
-0.073 0.046 0.003 0.042 
  
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
D_ICI*D_FINEXP (d)  -0.322***   
   (0.08)   
D_ICI*D_ROA (d) 
   
-0.193** 
 
    
(0.08) 
 D_ICI*D_LIQUID (d) 
    
-0.253***
     
(0.08) 
 
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
      
Costant -1.064*** -1.010*** -1.081*** -1.026*** -1.011*** 
 
(0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
Obs 4746 4746 4746 4746 4746 
LogL -1177.125 -1176.446 -1167.337 -1173.716 -1171.408 
Chi2 134.133*** 135.490*** 153.709*** 140.951*** 145.567*** 
Legend: *=sig. 10%; **=sig. 5%; ***=sig. 1% 
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Table 10 – Results of the multinomial logit estimates on the probability of exit early vs. late: dummies for size 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Early: firm exit before 2010; excluded category: active firm  Late: firm exit between 2010-2014; excluded category: active firm 
D_LARGE 0.767* 0.910** 0.933** 0.903** 0.893**  -0.908** -0.922** -0.898** -0.933** -0.956** 
 
(0.41) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42)  (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) 
D_SMALL 0.090 0.014 0.003 0.013 0.011  -0.264* -0.254* -0.256* -0.258* -0.266* 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
AGE -0.403* -0.401* -0.366 -0.405* -0.403*  -0.050 -0.051 -0.024 -0.068 -0.058 
 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
VERT_INT 0.274 0.167 0.242 0.182 0.159  0.748* 0.766* 0.810** 0.805** 0.717* 
 
(0.69) (0.68) (0.67) (0.68) (0.68)  (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) 
D_GROUP 0.027 0.110 0.134 0.108 0.110  -0.068 -0.077 -0.051 -0.087 -0.076 
 
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
LAB_PRDTY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TCI -0.780 -0.776 -0.847 -0.777 -0.796  -1.023** -1.026** -1.083** -1.054** -1.053** 
 
(0.71) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70)  (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
EXPORT -0.012* -0.011* -0.011* -0.011* -0.011*  0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
D_EU (d) 0.777 0.797 0.807 0.793 0.809  -0.281 -0.283 -0.248 -0.297 -0.263 
 
(0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66)  (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
D_EXTRAEU (d) 1.892*** 1.874*** 1.897*** 1.865*** 1.881***  -0.003 0.002 0.021 -0.023 0.025 
 
(0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66)  (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
FINEXP (index) 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.041** 0.050*** 0.051***  0.057*** 0.057*** 0.047*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
LIQUID (index) 0.115* 0.088 0.102 0.088 0.108  -0.177*** -0.173*** -0.155** -0.169*** -0.081 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
ROA (index) -0.422*** -0.431*** -0.408*** -0.408*** -0.430***  -0.436*** -0.438*** -0.417*** -0.363*** -0.433*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
D_ICI (d) 
 
-0.713*** -0.384 -0.659** -0.589**  
 
0.099 0.296* 0.251 0.315* 
  
(0.23) (0.25) (0.26) (0.28)  
 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
D_ICI*D_FINEXP (d) 
  
-1.032*** 
  
 
  
-0.562*** 
  
   
(0.37) 
  
 
  
(0.18) 
  D_ICI*D_ROA (d) 
   
-0.136
 
 
   
-0.457**
 
    
(0.35) 
 
 
   
(0.20) 
 D_ICI*D_LIQUID (d) 
    
-0.247  
    
-0.523***
 (0.32)  (0.19) 
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
            
Costant -1.681* -1.23 -1.397 -1.247 -1.227  -2.799*** -2.873*** -2.996*** -2.907*** -2.884*** 
 
(0.90) (0.90) (0.91) (0.90) (0.91)  (0.65) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) 
      
 
     Obs 4746 4746 4746 4746 4746  4746 4746 4746 4746 4746 
LogL -1362.751 -1357.694 -1348.188 -1354.814 -1353.665  -1362.751 -1357.694 -1348.188 -1354.814 -1353.665 
Chi2 164.873*** 174.986*** 193.999*** 180.747*** 183.046***  164.873*** 174.986*** 193.999*** 180.747*** 183.046*** 
Legend: *=sig. 10%; **=sig. 5%; ***=sig. 1% 
 
